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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jourdarryl Karrie Horton appeals from the Judgment of Conviction and Order of 
Probation. On appeal, Mr. Horton challenges the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress the evidence obtained following his arrest. The State argues that the officer 
was justified in stopping Mr. Horton. Mr. Horton's position and explanation why the 
State is incorrect is fully explained in his opening brief and no further reply on this 
argument is necessary. The State also argues on appeal that the intervening 
circumstances of the arrest warrant justified the search of the car for three reasons. 
First, the State recognizes that current United States Supreme Court case law prohibits 
the justification; however, it argues that the officer's good faith reliance on prior case law 
should render the search constitutional. Second, the State argues that exclusion of the 
illegally obtained evidence would be inappropriate. Third, the State argues for the first 
time on appeal, that the driver of the vehicle lacked standing. This Reply Brief will 
explain why the State's arguments are meritless. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Horton's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Horton's motion to suppress because the 
stop violated Mr. Horton's constitutional rights as Officer Sunada failed to possess any 
reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe Mr. Horton had been involved in any 
criminal activity and, therefore, evidence seized should have been suppressed? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Horton's Motion To Suppress Because The 
Stop Violated Mr. Horton's Constitutional Rights As Officer Sunada Failed To Possess 
Any Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion To Believe Mr. Horton Had Been Involved In 
Any Criminal Activity And. Therefore, Evidence Seized Should Have Been Suppressed 
A. Introduction 
The State argues that "the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the 
'bright line' rule of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)," and adopted a different 
standard. (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) Therefore, the State asserted that "[elven if the 
search of Horton's car was unreasonable under m, application of Idaho's 
exclusionary rule would be unreasonable." (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) The State seeks 
that this Court overrule ldaho precedent, ignore the ldaho Constitution, and adopt the 
  eon' good faith exception. (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-24.) Alternatively, the State 
requests that this Court hold that suppression would be inappropriate under Idaho's 
exclusionary rule. (Respondent's Brief, pp.24-25.) Finally and in the further alternative, 
the State argues for the first time on appeal that Mr. Horton failed to show that he has 
standing in the vehicle to exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.26-28.) Mr. Horton asserts that the State's arguments fail. 
B. The Retroactivitv Doctrine Requires That This Court Applv Gant In Evaluating 
The District Court's Decision To Deny Mr. Horton's Suppression Motion 
On appeal below, the State argued that the good faith exception precludes 
suppression of the evidence obtained in violation of Mr. Horton's rights under the Fourth 
Amendment. (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-24.) The State's assertion is without merit as 
' United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) 
the history of the retroactivity doctrine makes it clear, the "good faith exception" is 
inapplicable in this case and all cases wherein an officer conducts an unconstitutional 
warrantless search based on an erroneous reliance and reading of applicable case 
law.2 See generally Griffifh v. United States, 479 U.S. 314 (1987); Unifed States v. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982). 
In Johnson, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether Payton v. New ~ o r k , ~  
which prohibited police from making a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a 
suspect's home to make a felony arrest, should be applied retroactively to cases not yet 
final when the decision was rendered. Id. 457 U.S. at 537-539. The Johnson Court 
adopted the following analysis. The Court first determines whether it "has expressly 
declared a rule of criminal procedure to be a 'clear break' with the past," such that the 
Court has announced an "entirely new and unanticipated principle of law." Id. at 549- 
551 (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969)). A clear break within the 
law occurs "only when a decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court . . . 
or disapproves a practice this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior cases . . . or 
overturns a longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, 
but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority expressly approved." Id. at 
551 (internal citations omitted). Where the Court finds an unanticipated "new rule" has 
been created, to determine its retroactivity, the Court is to look to "(a) the purpose to be 
served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement 
As is set forth in detail below, even if the "good faith exception" is applicable to the 
instant situation, it is inapplicable under Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution and the 
State has failed to offer any cogent reason to overrule State v. Guzman, 122 ldaho 981, 
842 P.2d 660 (1992). 
Payfon v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a 
retroactive application of the new standards." Id. at 544 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 
U.S. 293 (1967)). However, where a decision construing the Fourth Amendment is not 
a "clear break from the past" it is applied retroactively to all cases not yet final when the 
decision is handed down. Id. at 562; see also Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 641, fn.3 
(1 984). 
The Johnson Court explained its rationale for applying Payton retroactively to all 
cases not yet final. First, "'[r]efusal to apply new constitutional rules to all cases arising 
on direct review . . . tends to cut this Court loose from the force of precedent, allowing 
us to restructure artificially those expectations legitimately created by extant law and 
thereby mitigate the practical force of stare decisis . . . a force which ought properly to 
bear on the judicial resolution of any legal problem."' Id. at 554-556 (quoting Mackey v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 680-681 (1971)). Next, the retroactive application of 
Payton to cases on direct review would "do justice to each litigant on the merits of his 
own case" and "resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best 
understanding of governing constitutional principles." Id. at 555 (citing Desist at 259; 
Mackey at 679). The Court observed that "[ijf a 'new' constitutional doctrine is truly 
right, we should not reverse lower courts which have accepted it; nor should we affirm 
those which have rejected the very arguments we have embraced." Id. (citing Desist at 
259). Finally, retroactive application furthers the goal of treating similarly situated 
defendants similarly. Id. The Court continued, "it goes without saying that Theodore 
Payton also was arrested before Payton was decided, and he received the benefit of the 
rule in his case." Id. "An approach that resolved all nonfinal convictions under the 
same rule of law would lessen the possibility that this Court might mete out different 
constitutional protection to defendants simultaneously subjected to identical police 
conduct." Id. 
The Johnson majority also addressed the concerns against the adoption of this 
retroactivity doctrine. The government in Johnson argued that if the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, the evidence should only be suppressed 
if the "law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may be properly charged with 
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." Id. 
(citing Unifed Sfafes v. Pelfier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)). In other words, the 
government argued that "new Fourth Amendment rules must be denied retroactive 
effect in all cases except those in which law enforcement officers failed to act in good- 
faith compliance with then-prevailing constitutional norms," and under an objective test, 
law enforcement officers can only be charged with knowledge of all "settled" Fourth 
Amendment law. Id. The Court quickly dispelled this argument, stating: 
Under this view, the only Fourth Amendment rulings worthy of retroactive 
application are those in which the arresting officers violated pre-existing 
guidelines clearly established by prior cases. But as we have seen above, 
cases involving simple application of clear, pre-existing Fourth 
Amendment guidelines raise no real questions of retroactivity at all. 
Literally read, the Government's theory would automatically eliminate all 
Fourth Amendment rulings from consideration for retroactive application. 
Id. at 560. Next, the government claimed that the retroactive effect of Payfon would not 
serve the policies under the exclusionary rule and would have little deterrent effect 
"because law enforcement officers would rarely be deterred from engaging in a practice 
they never expected to be invalidated." Id. The Court observed that it cannot rule on 
every unsettled question under the Fourth Amendment and years may pass before it 
finally "invalidates a police practice of dubious constitutionality." Id. Moreover, if "all 
rulings resolving unsettled Fourth Amendment questions should be nonretroactive, then, 
in close cases, law enforcement officials would have little incentive to err on the side of 
constitutional behavior." Id. at 56l(emphasis added). This would "encourage police or 
other courts to disregard the plain purport of our decisions and to adopt a let's-wait-until- 
it's-decided approach." Id (citing Desist at 277). Based on the foregoing rationales, the 
Johnson Court found that Payton applied retroactive to all cases not yet final. 
Then, in 1987, three years after the United States Supreme Court announced the 
good faith doctrine in Leon, the Court again revisited the retroactivity doctrine in 
Griffith V. United States, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). In Griffith, the Court was concerned with 
the potential retroactivity of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).~ In Griffith, the 
Court recognized the previous three prong test for retroactivity as well as the new test 
articulated in Johnson for dealing with Fourth Amendment cases. Id. 479 U.S. at 321- 
322. Relying heavily on the Johnson Court's analysis, which had embraced Justice 
Harlan's rationale in ~ e s i s f  and ~ a c k e ~ , ~  the Court held, "a new rule for the conduct of 
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases . . . not yet final, with no 
exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past." Id. 
at 328. In doing so, the Court observed, "[tjhe fact that a new rule may constitute a 
clear break with the past has no bearing on the 'actual inequity that results' when only 
one of many similarly situated defendants receives the benefit of the new rule." Id. at 
In Batson, the Court held that a criminal defendant could establish a prima facie case 
of racial discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment based on a prosecutor's 
use of peremptory challenges to strike members of a defendant's race from a jury 
venire. Id. at 96-98. 
Desist V. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1 969). 
327-328. The Court acknowledged that it would be impossible to hear every case 
pending on direct review and apply the rule to each case, but would "fulfill our judicial 
responsibility by instructing the lower courts to apply the new rule retroactively to cases 
not yet final." Id. at 323. 
It is readily apparent that the post-Leon decision in Griffifh, which adopted the 
analysis of Johnson that implicitly included the court's discussion of the exclusionary 
rule and deterrence, effectively removed the application of the good faith doctrine to 
cases pending on direct review when a decision interpreting the Constitution is rendered 
by this land's highest court. Just as the officers in Gant were operating under an overly 
broad and "unfounded" interpretation of Belton, so was Officer White in the instant case. 
The "integrity of judicial review" requires that all similarly situated defendants be treated 
the same. Here, where Mr. Horton's rights were violated by unconstitutional conduct by 
law enforcement, he is entitled to the same remedy as Gant, suppression of the fruits of 
the unlawful acts. 
This precise issue was recently addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Unifed States v. 
Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130 (gth Cir. 2009). In Gonzalez, the government conceded that 
Gant applied, but argued "nonetheless that the search was in good faith under the then- 
prevailing interpretation of Belton and that, therefore, the exclusionary rule should not 
be applied." Id. 578 F.3d at 1131-1132. The Gonzalez Court first observed that neither 
the United States Supreme Court, nor the Ninth Circuit had ever applied the good faith 
exception to the instant situation. Id. at 1132. Citing to Grjffjth and Johnson, supra, the 
Court stated, "To hold that Ganf may not be fully applied here, as the Government 
Mackey v. United States, 401 US.  667 (1971). 
urges, would conflict with the Court's retroactivity precedents." Id. (emphasis added). 
The Court concluded, "Because both Johnson and Griffith remain binding precedent, we 
cannot apply the good faith exception here without creating an untenable tension within 
existing Supreme Court law." Id. at 11 33 
In United States v. Buford, 623 F.Supp.2d 923, (M.D. Tenn. 2009), the Buford 
Court reached a similar result. There, balancing the government's argument that the 
good faith doctrine should be applied to save the unconstitutional search with the 
application of Griffith, the Court found in favor of suppressing the fruits of the 
impermissible Belton search. Id. 623 F.Supp.2d at 926-927; but see United States v. 
Grote 2009 WL 2068023 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (recognizing the conflict between Gant and 
the good faith doctrine in applying the good faith exception to the search). The Court 
stated: 
such an extension of the "good faith" exception would lead to perverse 
results. For instance, under the Government's argument, there is no basis 
for distinguishing the petitioner in the "new rule" case from similarly 
situated defendants whose cases were proceeding when the new rule was 
announced. That is, from the Government's view of the "good faith" 
exception, there is no distinction between Gant and the defendant here, 
because both arresting officers were operating in a Belton world. Under 
the Government's argument, then, Gant himself would only be entitled to 
the rather hollow relief of knowing that the search he was subjected to was 
a violation of his constitutional rights; that is, he would not be entitled to 
suppression of the evidence because the evidence was obtained in a 
good faith reliance on Belton. Anyone similarly situated to Gant (such as 
the defendant) who was unfortunate enough to be arrested pre-Gant 
would likewise receive the same hollow relief. Anyone similarly situated to 
Gant, however, who was arrested subsequent to the Gant decision would 
be entitled to suppression of the evidence because the Gant decision 
would eliminate the good faith argument. Therefore, the individual (Gant) 
who successfully convinced the Court that his Fourth Amendment rights 
had been violated would run the risk of criminal penalty, while subsequent 
defendants might go free, despite being subject to identical intrusions on 
privacy. Indeed, discussing a defendant similarly situated to the one in this 
case, one court noted, "[tlo say that an exception exists under the Leon 
rule to the application of [a] United States Supreme Court[ ] holding ... 
which would permit the principle of the [ ] holding to be ignored [in a case 
subsequent to the holding] ... to Defendant's prejudice, creates logical and 
rationalogical anomalies in implementation of Fourth Amendment doctrine 
of a decidedly perverse effect." U.S. v. Holmes, 175 F.Supp.2d 62 n. 6 
(D.Me.2001) (noting the conundrum but not resolving the issue). 
Id. 
Accordingly, as articulated herein, this Court should apply the retroactivity 
doctrine and reverse the district court's order denying Mr. Horton's suppression motion. 
C. The Leon "Good Faith" Exception To The Exclusionarv Rule Has No Ap~lication 
In The Instant Case 
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court addressed the application of the 
exclusionary rule to a case where a state superior judge had issued a facially valid 
warrant that was later executed by officers, but found to be invalid because the affidavit 
in support of the warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause. Unifed States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 902-904 (1984). The question before the Leon Court was whether 
the exclusionary rule should be applied to suppress evidence obtained when an officer, 
acting in objective good faith, reasonably relied on a facially valid warrant that was not 
supported by sufficient probable cause. Id. 
In adopting a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, the Court held that 
"the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppression of evidence obtained in 
objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot 
justify the substantial costs of exclusion." Id. at 922. The Court relied on the deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule and that the officers where acting in objective good 
faith on a facially valid warrant. Id. at 918-922. The Leon Court observed that the 
deterrent effect, which is meant to alter the behavior of individual law enforcement 
officers or the policies of their department, would have limited effect in the case where 
the error was on the part of a judge, rather than officer in executing the warrant. Id. 
In the years following Leon, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the good faith 
exception based on an officer's reliance on an error committed by a third party. See 
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (police reasonably relied on 
magistrate's issuance of a warrant); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (police 
reasonably relied on a statute's constitutionality); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) 
(police reasonably relied on record keeping error by a court clerk); and Herring v. United 
Sfafes, 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009) (officer's reliance on a negligent record keeping error 
attenuated from the search). However, the Court has never previously stated, or hinted, 
that a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule can be applied where an officer 
relies on the incorrect interpretation of then existing case law. 
1. Assuming Arquendo. That This Court Concludes The Retroactivity 
Doctrine Does Not Mandate Application Of The Exclusionarv Rule In This 
Case, The Ganf Decision Is Not A "Clear Break" In The Law And Was 
Foreshadowed BV Earlier Cases 
The United States Supreme Court has never applied the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule to determine whether suppression is appropriate when an officer 
was acting under an incorrect interpretation of the case law, so the standard it would 
employ is unknown. In the event the court were to apply the good faith exception to the 
instant situation, the history of the retroactivity doctrine suggests that the Court would 
look to determine whether the recent decision represents a clear break from then 
existing law or was foreshadowed by earlier cases. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 912-913, fn. 
10; Solem, 465 U.S. at 645-647; Johnson, 457 U.S. 549-554. 
Prior to Griffith, which made all new Fourth Amendment cases retroactive to those 
cases not yet final, in determining whether the new decision of the Supreme Court 
would be retroactively applied, the Court looked to whether the decision was 
foreshadowed by earlier cases or was a "clear break with the past." Solem, 465 U.S. at 
645-647; Johnson, 457 U.S. 549-554. A clear break within the law occurs "only when a 
decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court. . . or disapproves a practice 
this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior cases . . . or overturns a longstanding and 
widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous 
body of lower court authority expressly approved." Johnson, 457 U.S. at 551 (internal 
citations omitted) (emphasis added). Based on a review of the case law in existence at 
the time the illegal search in this case (June 7, 2008) as well as the Supreme Court's 
Opinion in Ganf, it is readily apparent that Gant was not a clear break from Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
a. Gant Does Not Explicitlv Overrule Belton Or Disapprove Of A 
Practice It Had Arauably Sanctioned In Prior Cases 
A court first looks to whether the new case "explicitly overrules" past precedent of 
the Supreme Court or disapproves of a practice it had "arguably sanctioned in prior 
cases." Johnson, 457 U.S. at 551. The Gant Court expressly stated that it was not 
overruling Belton, the case purportedly relied on by the State to sanction the search in 
this case. Gant, 129 S.Ct. Id. at 1723.   at her, it found that the overly broad reading 
other courts had attributed to the Belton decision was "unfounded." Id. In fact, the 
Court criticized any reading of Belton authorizing search incident to every recent 
occupant's arrest as "untether[ing] the rule from the justifications underlying the Chime1 
exceptions - a result clearly incompatible with our statement in Belfon that it 'in no way 
alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic 
scope of search incident to lawful custody arrest."' Id. at 1719 (emphasis added). 
In addition to the plain language from Belton, analyzing the case under Chimel 
and adopting it twin rationales, in 2004, the United States Supreme Court spoke to a 
Belfon related situation in Thornfon v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004). In Thornfon, 
an officer pulled over Thornton because the tags on his vehicle did not match the car he 
was driving. Id. 541 U.S. at 618. During a pat down, Thornton conceded that he was in 
possession of illegal narcotics, and the officer discovered marijuana and crack cocaine. 
Id. After Thornton was handcuffed and placed in the back of the patrol car, the officer 
searched Thornton's vehicle and found a 9-millimeter handgun. Id. 
The Thornfon Court concluded that the search was permissible pursuant to 
Belton. Id. at 616. Justice Rehnquist authored the opinion, except as to footnote 4,7 
Footnote 4 provides: 
Whatever the merits of Justice SCALIA's opinion concurring in the 
judgment, this is the wrong case in which to address them. Petitioner has 
never argued that Belton should be limited "to cases where it is 
reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be 
found in the vehicle," post, at 2137-38, nor did any court below consider 
Justice SCALIA's reasoning. See Pennsylvania Dept of Corrections v. 
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212-213, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) 
( " 'Where issues are neither raised before nor considered by the Court of 
Appeals, this Court will not ordinarily consider them' " (quoting Adickes v. 
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147, n. 2, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 
(1970))). The question presented-"[wlhether the bright-line rule announced 
in New York v. Belfon is confined to situations in which the police initiate 
contact with the occupant of a vehicle while that person is in the vehicle," 
Pet. for Cert.-does not fairly encompass Justice SCALIA's analysis. See 
this Court's Rule 14.l(a) ("Only the questions set out in the petition, or 
fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court"). And the United 
States has never had an opportunity to respond to such an approach. See 
Yee V. Escondido, 503 U.S. 51 9, 536, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 
and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer joined the opinion in full. Id. Justice 
O'Conner joined the opinion, with the exception of footnote 4, and filed an opinion 
concurring in part. Id. Justice Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, 
which was joined by Justice Ginsburg. Id. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, 
which was joined by Justice Souter. Id. 
In Justice O'Conner's concurring opinion, she wrote, "I write separately to 
express my dissatisfaction with the state of the law in this area." Id. at 624. Justice 
O'Conner recognized the problem with Belton's "shaky foundation" and that "lower court 
decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a 
recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception." Id. at 624-625. 
However, Justice O'Conner refused to adopt Justice Scalia's approach because "neither 
the Government nor the petitioner has had a chance to speak to its merit." Id. at 625. 
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
forcibly expressed his displeasure with Belfon. Id. at 625-632. Justice Scalia first 
recognized that which is obvious to any rational person that when Thornton's car was 
searched, he was neither in nor near the passenger compartment of his vehicle, but 
was handcuffed and secured in the officer's patrol car. ld. at 625. He continued, "The 
risk that a suspect handcuffed in the back of a squad car might escape and recover a 
weapon from his vehicle is surely no greater than the risk that a suspect handcuffed in 
his residence might escape and recover a weapon from the next room," a danger 
(1992). Under these circumstances, it would be imprudent to overrule, for 
all intents and purposes, our established constitutional precedent, which 
governs police authority in a common occurrence such as automobile 
searches pursuant to arrest, and we decline to do so at this time. 
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rejected in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Id. at 627. Justice Scalia 
concluded that the Belton vehicle search incident to arrest rule should be limited "to 
cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be 
found in the vehicle." Id. at 631. 
As the Gant Court recognized, Thornton is consistent with both Chimel and 
Belton. Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1722. Whereas in Belton, it was possible for the occupants 
to access the passenger compartment of the vehicle, thus justifying the search, in 
Thornton it was impossible for the occupant to access the passenger compartment, but 
the officer had discovered illegal substances thereby justifying the search of the 
passenger compartment to discover evidence of the arresting offense. See Belton, 453 
U.S. 455-458; Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618. The ultimate decision in Gant was merely 
derived from a logical reading of Chimel, Belton, and Thornton together, as the Arizona 
Supreme Court ascertained and scribed in its opinion in Arizona v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640 
(Ariz. 2007). Moreover, the Gant Court expressed its displeasure with the continued 
broad reading of Belton in light of its Thornton decision, stating in a footnote, "The 
practice of searching vehicles incident to arrest after the arrestee has been handcuffed 
and secured in a patrol car has not abated since we decided Thornton. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 
at 1719 fn.3. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Belton was overruled by Gant or that 
Gant disapproves of a practice it had "arguably sanctioned in prior cases." 
b. Gant Does Not Overturn A Lonqstanding And Wides~read Practice 
To Which This Court Has Not Spoken, But Which A Near- 
Unanimous Bodv Of Lower Court Authoritv Expressly Approved 
The next factor in determining whether a new decision should be uniformly 
applied to all cases pending on direct review, is whether the new decision "overturns a 
longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a 
near-unanimous body of lower court authority expressly approved." Johnson, 457 U.S. 
at 551 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). First of all, the U.S. Supreme Court has, at 
the very least, implicitly spoken to the issue based on a logical reading of Chimel, 
Belton, and Thornton, as articulated above, which need not be repeated, but is 
incorporated herein by reference. 
The overly broad interpretation of Belton, relied on by the State to justify the 
search of Mr. Horton, who was arrested on a warrant for failure to appear, and his 
vehicle searched while he was handcuffed in the back of the patrol cruiser, is far from a 
long standing and widespread practice. Rather, there has been tremendous dispute as 
to the permissible application of the Belton rule throughout the states and even in the 
circuit courts. In Idaho, the first case to adopt what it believed to be the Belton rule 
under Art. I, § 17 of the ldaho Constitution (the rule the Gant Court criticized as being an 
overly broad application of Belfon) was State v. Charpentier, 131 ldaho 349, 962 P.2d 
1033 (1998).~ In Charpentier, Ms. Charpentier was stopped and arrested for driving on 
a suspended license. Id. 131 ldaho at 650-651, 962 P.2d at 7034-1035. While 
Charpentier was handcuffed and in the back of the patrol cruiser, the officer searched 
her vehicle, ultimately locating controlled substances. Id. at 651, 962 P.2d 1035. 
In a 3-2 decision, this Court stated that the Belton rule that "a police officer may 
search the passenger compartment of an automobile as a contemporaneous incident of 
the arrest, even if the occupant has been removed from the automobile," "is the proper 
In State v. Wafts, 142 ldaho 230, 127 P.3d 133 (2005) the ldaho Supreme Court 
refused to adopt Justice Scalia's concurrence in Thornfon as the proper interpretation of 
Belton under the ldaho Constitution. 
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interpretation of what protections are provided by Article 1, $17 of the ldaho 
Constitution." Charpentier, 131 ldaho at 652, 962 P.2d at 1036. The dissent, however, 
would have suppressed the fruits of the search because they were not 
"instrumentalities" of the arrest, which of course was one of the permissible reasons for 
a search articulated in Gant and addressed in Thornton. Id. at 655, 962 P.2d at 1039. 
At the time of Gant, there were at least 12 states that had rejected a broad 
application of the Belton rule either under a restricted but proper reading of Belton or 
under a state statutory or constitutional analysis. See Arizona v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640 
(Ariz. 2007); State v. Bauder, 924 A.2d 38, 46 (Vt. 2007); State v. Valdez, 152 P.3d 
1048, 1051 (Wash Ct. App. 2007); Camacho v. State, 75 P.3d 370, 373-374 (Nev. 
2003); Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 489 (Wyo. 1999); State v. Arredondo, 944 P.2d 
276, 284 (N.M. 1997); Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. 1995); Ferrell v. 
State, 649 So.2d 831, 833 (Miss. 1995); State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 959 (N.J. 1994); 
People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61, 63-64 (N.Y. 1989); State v. Feslor, 685 P.2d 1014, 
1016-1017 (Or. App. 1984); Commonwealth v. Toole, 448 N.E.2d 1264, 1266-1267 
(Mass. 1983); State v. Hernandez, 41 0 So.2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982). Moreover, as the 
Gant Court recognized, courts have been at odds "regarding how close in time to the 
arrest and how proximate to the arrestee's vehicle an officer's first contact with the 
arrestee must be to bring the encounter within" Belton. See Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1720, 
fn.6. Thus, given the various views throughout the states, the State's attempt to justify 
the search with the broad application of Belton is inappropriate. 
2. Suppression Of The Fruits Of The Search In The Instant Case Is 
Necessarv To Enforce The Deterrent Effect Of The Exclusionarv Rule 
In Leon, the Supreme Court recognized that the exclusionary rule "operates as a 
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect." Id. 468 U.S. at 906 (internal citations omitted). The Court 
in Leon opined that because the officer was executing a facially valid warrant, issued by 
a judge with insufficient probable cause, the deterrent effect on police officers of 
applying the exclusionary rule would be minimal. Id. at 918-922. It has long been 
recognized that the preferred route prior to a search is for an officer to obtain a warrant 
as "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge 
or magistrate, are perse unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357 (1967). In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has "expressed a strong 
preference for warrants and declared that 'in a doubtful or marginal case a search under 
the warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 914 
(quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965)). 
In reading Chimel, Belton, and Thornton together, it was far from settled law that 
an officer could search a vehicle incident to arrest where the occupant was secured, 
and it was not objectively reasonable to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the 
offense of arrest. However, in Idaho, officers are apparently taught that they are 
"entitled" to search every vehicle, incident to the occupant's arrest, despite any 
evidence the vehicle would contain contraband relevant to the offense of arrest or that it 
would be impossible for the occupant to access the passenger compartment unless he 
"possessed the skill of Houdini and the strength of Hercules." Thornfon, 541 U.S. at 
626 (quoting United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973) (Judge Goldberg 
concurring in part, dissenting in part)). It is in these gray areas where officers should be 
seeking warrants, rather than violating the security of "[c]ountless individuals guilty of 
nothing more serious than a traffic violation . . . ." Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1722-1723. 
Otherwise, "in close cases, law enforcement officials would have little incentive to err on 
the side of constitutional behavior." Johnson, 457 U.S. at 560. Failing to apply the 
exclusionary rule to this Fourth Amendment violation "would 'encourage police and 
other courts to disregard the plain purport of our decisions and to adopt a iets-wait-until- 
its-decided approach." Id. (citing Desist, 394 U.S. at 277) 
Accordingly, for these reasons this Court should reverse the district court's denial 
of Mr. Horton's suppression motion and apply the exclusionary rule to the State's Fourth 
Amendment violation 
D. This Court Should Abide Bv The Rule Of Sfare Decisis And Reaffirm State v. 
Guzman, Because It's Holding Is Consistent With The Ori~inal Intent Of The 
Framers Of The ldaho Constitution And Furthers Important Goals Of The 
Exclusionarv Rule 
The State argues that State v. Guzman, 122 ldaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992), 
should be overruled and that ldaho should adopt the good faith doctrine. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.14-24.) The State's argument is without merit. 
In 1992, the ldaho Supreme Court held that: 
we finally and unequivocally no longer adhere to a policy of sheepishly 
following in the footsteps of the U.S. Supreme Court in the area of state 
constitutional analysis. Based on our independent analysis of the merits 
of the good faith exception, as viewed in light of long-standing provisions 
of our ldaho Constitution, we are convinced that it is ill-conceived and 
cannot be reconciled with art. 1, § 17 of our state constitution. Accordingly, 
we conclude that the citizenry of ldaho will be better served if it no longer 
controls. We so hold. 
Guzman, 122 ldaho at 998,842 P.2d at 677 
Despite this clear holding, the State asks that the good faith exception be applied 
to the case at bar. (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-24.) However, Guzman should not be 
overruled as the rule of stare decisis supports its retention, and the holding in Guzman 
is consistent with the original intent of the framers of the ldaho Constitution and furthers 
important goals of the exclusionary rule. 
The ldaho Supreme Court has stated that "the rule of stare decisis dictates that 
we follow [controlling precedent], unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over 
time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, 
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." Reyes v. Kit Manufacturing 
Co., 131 ldaho 239, 953 P.2d 989 (1998) (quoting Houghland Farms, lnc. v. Johnson, 
119 ldaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990); State v. Al-Kotrani, 141 ldaho 66, 70, 106 
P.3d 392, 396 (2005) (declining to overrule State v. Green, 130 ldaho 503, 943 P.2d 
929 (1997)). And, of course, precisely when such conditions exist is often a subject of 
debate. See, e.g., Cufsinger v. Spears Mfg. Co., Inc., 137 ldaho 464, 50 P.3d 479 
(2002) (Kidwell, J., dissenting); State v. MaidweN, 137 ldaho 424, 50 P.3d 439 (2002) 
(Trout, C.J., dissenting). 
In State v. Donato, 135 ldaho 469, 20 P.3d 5 (2001), the ldaho Supreme Court 
reiterated that, "State Courts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their 
constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court," as that court "establishes no more 
than a floor of constitutional protection[.]" Id. at 471, 20 P.3d at 7 (citations omitted). In 
concluding that the ldaho Constitution did not offer greater protection than the federal 
constitution regarding warrantless garbage searches, the Donato Court recognized that: 
ldaho has clearly developed an exclusionary rule as a constitutionally 
mandated remedy for illegal searches and seizures in addition to other 
purposes behind the rule such as recognizing the exclusionary rule as a 
deterrent for police misconduct .... When the U.S. Supreme Court in Leon 
abandoned the original purposes of the exclusionary rule as adopted by 
ldaho, and focused the rule solely as a deterrent to illegal police behavior 
this Court did not follow .... The holding in  Guzman was based on long- 
standing jurisprudence regarding the ldaho Constitution. 
Id. at 472, 20 P.3d at 8 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Guzman was correctly decided both as a matter of original intent and modern 
constitutional interpretation and cannot be overruled on the basis of manifest error, 
injustice, lack of wisdom, the vindication of obvious principles of law or the avoidance of 
manifest injustice. Accordingly, this Court should abide by the rule of stare decisis and 
reaffirm Guzman 
1. Under An Oriqinal Intent Analysis, It Is Clear That The Drafters Of 
Article I, 6 17 Did Not intend For There To Be A Good-Faith Exception To 
The Exclusionarv Rule 
Broadly speaking, constitutional analysis has been divided between those jurists 
who see the Constitution as a document which needs to be interpreted in light of 
changing times and social conditions (the "dynamic" model), and those who believe the 
document means what the framer's intended at the time of the adoption (the "original 
intent" or "static" model). See and compare for example, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304 (2002) (Stevens, J., applying the "evolving standards of decency" test to Eighth 
Amendment claim and Scalia, J. dissenting because the claim that executing the 
mentally retarded is cruel and unusual "find[s] no support in the text or history of the 
Eighth Amendment."). In this case, however, the State cannot justify its request to 
overrule State V. Guzman, supra, under either the dynamic or static model of 
constitutional interpretation. 
First, the State's position finds no support from the original intent of the framers. 
Article I, § 17 of our constitution states that the right of the people "to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit . 
. ." As has been noted before, the quoted text is nearly the same as the language of the 
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 471, 20 P.3d 5, 7 
(2001). Indeed, it can be logically presumed that the framers of the State Constitution 
(many of whom were lawyersg) were aware of this similarity. And, as the State 
Constitution was adopted in 1889 and approved by Congress the next year (Act of 
July 3, 1890, ch.656, 26 Stat. 215) it can be further presumed that the original intent of 
the framers was to adopt the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as it existed in 
1889. Thus, if this Court seeks the original intent of the framers of the State 
Constitution, it should look to what the Fourth Amendment meant in 1889. 
This Court's early cases looked to the origins of the State Constitutional 
provisions and to the then-existing judicial interpretation of those provisions in order to 
discern the meaning of our own Constitution. Two examples illustrate this Court's 
method. 
Of the seventy-two delegates, twenty-five were admitted to practice before this Court. 
Five other delegates had practiced law in other jurisdictions or had trained as lawyers. 
Colson, D., "Idaho's Constitution: The tie that binds," Chap. 1, pg. 20, n.34 & 35 (1991) 
(hereillafter, "Colson."). 
First, just five years after the constitutional convention, this Court was called on 
to determine the scope of its writ power under Article V, 3 9'' in Stein v. Morrison, 9 
ldaho 426, 75 P. 246, 256-57 (1904). There, the Court looked to the section of the 
California constitution that served as the model for our provision and determined that 
this Court's power was coextensive with that of the California court's at the time of the 
adoption of our constitution, as that must have been the framer's intent: 
When a statutory or constitutional provision is adopted from another state, 
where the courts of that state have placed a construction upon the 
language of such statute or constitution, it is to be presumed that it was 
taken in view of such judicial interpretation, and with the purpose of 
adopting the language as the same had been interpreted and construed 
by the courts of the state from which it was taken. 
Seven years later, this Court reiterated this presumption, writing that: 
[tlhe courts of this state would be most strongly inclined to follow the 
interpretation placed upon the like constitutional provision by the California 
court prior to our adoption of the same. This construction appeals to us as 
being reasonable and just, and fairly within the contemplation of the 
framers of the Constitution. 
Ex pafte Schriber, 19 ldaho 531, 532 114 P. 29, 30 (1911). In Schriber, the Court held 
that Article I, § 6 (the constitutional provisions relating to bail, excessive fines and cruel 
and unusual punishment) to be coextensive with California's provision, as interpreted in 
1889. Id. 19 ldaho 531-532, 114 P. 29-30. This case also demonstrates that the 
provisions of Article I (Idaho's "Declaration of Rights") should be understood to have 
'O That provision states: "The Supreme Court shall also have original jurisdiction to 
issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and all writs necessary 
or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction." 
incorporated the then existing case law construing the analogous state or federal 
provision 
What then of Article I, 3 17, which was modeled after the Fourth Amendment? 
While there was a federal exclusionary rule in 1889, there was no good-faith exception 
to the rule. Boyd v. United Sfafes, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). That constitutional innovation 
did not appear for another 98 years. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
In Boyd, the district attorney of New York filed a forfeiture action under federal 
custom laws alleging that a shipping company defrauded the government out of custom 
tariffs by misrepresenting the contents of a shipment. Id. I 16  U.S. at 617. Prior to the 
trial, the district attorney applied for an order, authorized by the customs code, requiring 
the shipping company to turn over the shipping invoice and the trial court granted the 
order. Id. at 618. The company complied with the order under protest and was 
convicted after the evidence obtained via the order was introduced at trial. Id. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the evidence 
was obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 
We think that the notice to produce the invoice in this case, the order by 
virtue of which it was issued, and the law which authorized the order, were 
unconstitutional and void, and that the inspection by the district attorney of 
said invoice, when produced in obedience to said notice, and its 
admission in evidence by the court, were erroneous and unconstitutional 
proceedings. 
116 U.S. at 638. 
There is nothing in the Boyd Opinion to suggest that the district attorney was not 
acting in good-faith reliance upon a (presumably valid) Congressional enactment and a 
(facially valid) order of a federal district court when obtaining the evidence. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule. In light of that holding, 
it must be concluded that the United States Supreme Court and, by extension, the 
framers of Article I, § 17 intended that the exclusionary rule provide a remedy to 
unreasonable searches and seizures and further that the remedy should apply to 
violations irrespective of any "good-faith" of the government agents. 
In sum, under an "original intent" analysis, the State's request to overrule 
Guzman should be rejected because the framers of the State Constitution never 
intended such an interpretation of Article I, § 17. The same result obtains when using 
the dynamic model of constitutional analysis. 
2. There Is No Requirement That This Court Adopt, Under Article 1, S 17, 
Everv Interpretation Of The Fourth Amendment Adopted By The United 
States Supreme Court 
This Court has not, at least in modern times, looked to the framer's original 
intent. Instead, it has evaluated the reasons and merits of the particular federal 
constitutional rule before deciding whether to adopt it under the state constitution. In 
this same vein, it has stated that it is "at liberty" to find within the provisions of the state 
constitution "greater protections than is afforded under the federal constitution as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." State v. Donato, 135 ldaho at 471, 20 
P.3d at 7 (2001) (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 71 9 (1975); see also, Donato, 
135 ldaho at 474, 20 P.2d at 10 (Schroeder, J., specially concurring "in the reasoning" 
of the Court's opinion)). 
This independent analysis is not only a recognition of the sovereignty of Idaho, it 
also serves to protect Idaho's citizens when the United States Supreme Court is simply 
incorrect about what is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. For example, at the 
time of Gant, Belton had been rejected by 12 different states. See Section (I)(B)(2)(b). 
Finally, it recognizes that the United States Supreme Court rarely speaks with a 
single voice on controversial constitutional issues and the correct answer for ldaho 
might be found in a dissenting opinion, instead of in the majority view 
3. The Good-Faith Exception Is Inconsistent With This Court's Decision in 
State v. Arrequi, 44 ldaho 43. 254 P. 788 (1927) 
The exclusionary rule was expressly adopted under Article 1, § 17 in State v. 
Arregui, 44 ldaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927). There, the Court noted the overruling of 
State v. Anderson, 31 ldaho 514, 174 P. 124 (1918), by State v. Myers, 36 ldaho 396, 
21 1 P.440 (1 922). Anderson had held that "[elvidence otherwise competent and 
relevant to the issue is not rendered inadmissible by reason of it having been disclosed 
by an unlawful search or obtained by an unlawful seizure." Anderson, 31 ldaho at 515, 
174 P. 125. In doing so, the Anderson Court relied upon the treatise Greenleaf on 
Evidence as well as state and foreign cases, but did not look to the United States 
Supreme Court interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as of 1889. This omission by 
the Court was noted in dissent by Justice Morgan. 
These sections [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and 
the right against self-incrimination] had, more than five years prior to the 
adoption of our Constitution, been construed by the United States 
Supreme Court, in the case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 
Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed.746, and we are deemed to have adopted them in 
view of the interpretation placed upon them by that court and with the 
intention that they receive a like construction. 
Justice Morgan's statements about the original intent of the framers are 
compelling as he was a delegate at the constitutional convention and a member of both 
the Preamble and Bill of Rights Committee and the Judiciary Committee. See, Colson, 
p.236. Neither member of the Anderson majority (Justices Rice and Budge) was 
present at the drafting of the state constitution. Id. 
Justice Morgan's view prevailed shortly thereafter in Myers, supra, where a 
majority of the Court stated in a special concurrence that it approved of the federal 
exclusionary rule as stated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1915). Weeks, in 
turn, cited to and relied upon the 1886 case of Boyd v. United States, supra. 
The Arregui Court looked at the Anderson case and disagreed with or 
distinguished the cases relied upon by the Anderson Court In particular it noted that 
many of the out-of-state cases cited in Anderson were no longer followed by that state. 
Arregui, 44 Idaho at -, 254 P. at 796. The Court then independently evaluated the 
merits of the exclusionary rule and adopted it under the state constitution stating that it 
would not do so merely because the United States Supreme Court has adopted it, 
although it would give the opinions of that Court due consideration. Id. There is nothing 
in Arregui to suggest that this Court was adopting a view of Article I, § 17 which would 
change whenever the federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment changes. 
The Arregui Court adopted the federal exclusionary rule as it existed in 1886 
when Boyd was decided, not as a moving target which would change (without input 
from Idaho as no Idahoan has ever been appointed to the United States Supreme 
Court) turning on five votes of the current members of the Court. And as there was no 
hint in Boyd that the government was acting in anything less than total good-faith it 
cannot be concluded that the Arregui Court intended to carve out a good-faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule. 
Further, we know that the Arregui Court did not feel that it was required to follow 
Fourth Amendment law. The Fourth Amendment did not apply to the states in 1927, as 
was stated in Weeks itself. Thus, this Court knew it could, but was not required, to 
adopt the Weeks rule under the Idaho Constitution. In fact, the Fourth Amendment 
would not be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment until Wolff v. Colorado, 338 
U.S. 25 (1949) and the exclusionary rule would not be so incorporated until Mapp v. 
Ohio, 342 U.S. 117 (1951). Arregui adopted the then-existing exclusionary rule in its 
authority as the highest court for an independent sovereign, not because it was required 
to walk in lockstep with the federal 
In its briefing, the State argues that the only goal of the federal exclusionary rule 
IS the deterrence of police misconduct. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) While 
deterrence of law enforcement officers is one purpose, it is also "fair to say that the 
deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures is a major purpose of the [Boyd and 
Weeks] exclusionary rule." 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment (3rd Ed.) § l . l ( f )  (1996). Deterrence of constitutional violations in general 
" The Delaware Court recently expressed this same thought. 
Although Delaware is bound together with the forty-nine other States in an 
indivisible federal union, it remains a sovereign State, governed by its own 
laws and shaped by its own unique heritage. An examination of those laws 
and that heritage may, from time to time, lead to the conclusion that 
Delaware's citizens enjoy more rights, more constitutional protections, 
than the Federal Constitution extends to them. If we were to hold that our 
Constitution is simply a mirror image of the Federal Constitution, we would 
be relinquishing an important incident of this State's sovereignty. In a very 
real sense, Delaware would become less of a State than its sister States 
who recognize the independent significance of their Constitutions. 
Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 814-815 (Del. 2000). 
is a much broader proposition than deterrence of police misconduct because it includes 
mistakes made by the Judiciary and Legislature. 
This broader deterrent effect was adopted in Boyd. In that case, it was a 
presumably valid court order based upon a presumptively valid Congressional 
enactment by which the government obtained the evidence. Nevertheless, the United 
States Supreme Court found suppression the correct remedy. Thus, the deterrent effect 
of Idaho's exclusionary rule is aimed at reducing all error regardless of whether the error 
is made by the judicial, legislative or executive branch. This makes sense because, so 
far as the victim of the unconstitutional search is concerned, it makes no difference 
whether the police have decided to search without a warrant, or a judicial officer has 
decided to issue one without probable cause, or the legislature has passed an 
unconstitutional law permitting the search. In all these cases, the constitutional violation 
has the same effect on the individual whose rights have been violated 
Professor LaFave goes on to note that: 
[Wlhile it may be fair to say that deterrence is the "major thrust" of the 
exclusionary rule, the rule does serve other purposes as well. There is, 
for example, what the Elkins ~ o u r t ' ~  referred to as the "the imperative of 
judicial integrity," namely that the courts not become "accomplices in the 
willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold." 
A third purpose of the exclusionary rule . . . is that "of assuring the people- 
all potential victims of unlawful government conduct-that the government 
would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of 
seriously undermining popular trust in government." While at first blush 
this may appear to be merely a statement of the deterrent function, this is 
not the case, for the focus is on the effect of exclusion upon the public 
rather than the police. 
j2 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) 
Support for this third purpose of the exclusionary rule is found in Weeks itself as 
well as being one of the reasons set forth in State v. Arregui. 
A continued disregard for the rights guaranteed under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, and the principles thereof incorporated in state 
Constitutions, heads us directly to revolution against their usurpation, if 
history tells us correctly that violation of the rights sought to be protected 
thereby was one of the chief moving reasons for the Revolution. 
Id. a t ,  254 P. at 792. 
Thus, the State's argument, i.e., that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule should be adopted because suppression of evidence obtained by the police in 
good-faith reliance on what it believed to be the law at the time of the search does not 
further the purposes of the Idaho exclusionary rule, is demonstratively false. The rule 
furthers the goal of judicial integrity, in that the courts do not participate in what amounts 
to a second violation of the individual rights by admitting the illegally seized items into 
evidence. And, it furthers the goal of public trust in governmental institutions by not 
permitting the government to profit from its own wrong doings. These goals of the 
Arregui Court are all furthered by the current exclusionary rule and undermined by 
Leon. 
4. State v. Guzman Was Correctlv Decided 
It is because of the Guzman court's proper view of the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule, that it was correctly decided. It also correctly noted that it was the 
United States Supreme Court which had gone away from the original purposes of the 
exclusionary rule in a series of cases starting with United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338 (1974), by focusing too narrowly on the police deterrent rationale. Guzman, 122 
ldaho at 992, 842 P.2d at 671. Leon, of course, was the eventual result of this too 
narrow focus. This Court noted, however, there were five purposes13 to the ldaho 
exclusionary rule and that four of the five reasons still applied even in the case of true 
good-faith reliance by the police on a facially valid judicially issued warrant. Id. at 993. 
ldaho is by no means alone in its views. As noted above, a number of other 
states have rejected the good-faith exception under their respective state constitutions 
or on statutory grounds. See State v. Bauder, 924 A.2d 38, 46 (Vt. 2007); State v. 
Valdez, 152 P.3d 1048, 1051 (Wash Ct. App. 2007); Camacho v. State, 75 P.3d 370, 
373-374 (Nev. 2003); Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 489 (Wyo. 1999); State v. 
Arredondo, 944 P.2d 276, 284 (N.M. 1997); Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 
902 (Pa. 1995); Ferrell v. State, 649 So.2d 831, 833 (Miss. 1995); State v. Pierce, 642 
A.2d 947, 959 (N.J. 1994); People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61, 63-64 (N.Y. 1989); State v. 
Fesler, 685 P.2d 1014, 1016-1017 (Or. App. 1984); Commonwealth v. Toole, 448 
N.E.2d 1264, 1266-1267 (Mass. 1983); Stafe v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381, 1385 (La. 
l3 The fifth goal of the exclusionary rule indicates that it is necessary "to provide an 
effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an unreasonable government 
search and/or seizure," is especially important in light of another judicially created 
limitation on remedies for Fourth Amendment violations: the qualified immunity defense 
that law enforcement personnel have in civil rights claims brought under 42 
U.S.C. 9 1983. A person who has been a victim of a Fourth Amendment violation may 
not recover against the police officers committing the violation in a civil rights action 
unless the Fourth Amendment law was "clearly established" at the time of the violation 
and the officers considering the facts and circumstances acted "unreasonably" when 
they violated that clearly established law. See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 
227 (1991); Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993). The 
combination of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule and the qualified 
immunity defense to a civil rights action, leaves some defendants who have had their 
Fourth Amendment rights violated by the illegal police conduct with no remedy at all. 
This is a result properly avoided by the Arregui exclusionary rule. 
1982); People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451 (1985); 
People v. Bennett, 653 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Sup. 1996); State v. Crawley, 808 P.2d 773 
(Wash. App. 1991); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1992); lrno v. State, 826 S.W.2d 
714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). 
Since Guzman was decided, three other state courts have followed this Court's 
lead. Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807 (Del. 2000); State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097 (N.H. 
1995); State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277 (lowa 2000) (overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (lowa 2001)), 
The Cline Court rejected the Leon reasoning as follows: 
Although more recent Supreme Court decisions, as represented by 
Leon, have narrowed the focus of the exclusionary rule to the deterrence 
of constitutional violations by law enforcement, the rule was originally 
justified for the additional reasons that it provided a remedy for the 
constitutional violation and protected judicial integrity. See Mapp, 367 U.S. 
at 656-57, 659, 81 S.Ct. at 1692, 1694, 6 L.Ed.2d at 1090-92. Regardless 
of whether one believes that the post-Mapp cases have revised the history 
of the exclusionary rule or merely refined the rule, we think the rule serves 
a purpose greater than simply deterring police misconduct. Clearly our 
early cases viewed the exclusionary rule as a remedy for the constitutional 
violation and relevant to the integrity of the courts. 
It is true, as the Supreme Court has noted, that suppression of the 
evidence does not "cure" the constitutional invasion, see Leon, 468 U.S. at 
906, 104 S.Ct. at 3412, 82 L.Ed.2d at 687, but it is clearly the best remedy 
available. As with many civil remedies, the exclusionary rule merely places 
the parties in the positions they would have been in had the 
unconstitutional search not occurred, and the State is deprived only of that 
to which it was not entitled in the first place. 
As this court has stated, the exclusionary rule also protects the integrity of 
the courts. The reasoning that leads to this conclusion is obvious. By 
admitting evidence obtained illegally, courts would in essence condone 
the illegality by stating it does not matter how the evidence was secured. 
Even if we were to accept the [United States Supreme] Court's proposition 
that the exclusionary rule is aimed solely at deterrence, we cannot accept 
the Court's limitation on the deterrence function to law enforcement. 
Common sense tells us that the exclusionary rule prompts more care and 
attention at all stages of the warrant-issuing process, including by the 
judicial officers issuing the warrant. The same can be said for legislative 
action. The knowledge that an unconstitutional statute will be of no 
assistance to law enforcement will certainly tend to encourage lawmakers 
to take care to ensure that any law they enact passes constitutional 
muster. Thus, the exclusionary rule serves a deterrent function even 
when the police officers act in good faith. Consequently, to adopt a good 
faith exception would only encourage lax practices by government officials 
in all three branches of government. 
617 N.W.2d 289-290 (citations omitted and emphasis added). 
In conclusion, this Court should decline any invitation to overrule State v. 
Guzman. Guzman is not manifestly in error, unjust, lacking in wisdom, nor should it be 
overruled in order to vindicate obvious principles of law or to avoid manifest injustice. 
To the contrary, as shown above, Guzman is soundly reasoned from both historical and 
modern viewpoints and it furthers justice by deterring future constitutional violations and 
by providing an effective remedy when they do occur 
E. Suppression Of The Evidence In This Case Serves The Purposes Of Idaho's 
Exclusionary Rule 
In Guzman, the Court reiterated the rationale under Idaho's exclusionary rule 
necessary to: 
1. Provide an effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an 
unreasonable government search andlor seizure; 
2. Deter the police from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; 
3. Encourage thoroughness in the warrant issuing process; 
4. Avoid having the judiciary commit an additional constitutional violation 
by considering evidence which has been obtained through illegal 
means; and 
5. Preserve judicial integrity. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993, 842 P.2d at 672 
First, as is addressed in detail above, suppression of the evidence in this case is 
potentially the only remedy available to Mr. Horton, where it is entirely possible he 
would not succeed in a civil law suit. See Footnote 13. Moreover, the State's position 
below that Officer Sunada's conduct was legal and reasonable at the time of the search 
ignores the language of the Ganf Opinion criticizing our court's overly broad reading of 
Belfon in light of Chime1 and Thornton. Second, as set forth above, applying the 
exclusionary rule will satisfy and reinforce its intended deterrent effect. Third, exclusion 
of the illegally obtained evidence will encourage officers not to take a wait-and-see 
approach when it comes to questionable police actions and those officers will be more 
likely to "err on the side of constitutional behavior" and seek the issuance of a warrant 
prior to conducting the search. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 560. Fourth, as is with the clear 
import of the exclusionary rule, this Court would compound Mr. Horton's constitutional 
violation by permitting its use against him, thereby rewarding Officer Sunada for failing 
to seek to obtain a search warrant. Finally, judicial integrity will be served as it cannot 
be argued that the officer responsible for the search in Gant was also relying on this 
same broad reading of Belton, yet the United States Supreme Court did not deem it 
appropriate to ignore the constitutional violation or refuse to suppress the fruits of its 
trespass because the officer made a mistake of law. See Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1722-1723. 
Thus, Mr. Horton would be treated the same as a similarly situated Gant was treated. 
Accordingly, the goals of Idaho's exclusionary rule would be served by 
suppressing the illegally obtained evidence in the instant case. 
F. Mr. Horton Had A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacv In The Vehicle And, 
Therefore, Has Standing To Challenge The llleqal Governmental Search Of That 
Vehicle 
Contrary to the State's argument, in establishing standing,14 Mr. Horton was not 
required to show that he owned the vehicle that was searched; only that he was 
legitimately in  control of that vehicle. In this case, the record supports the district 
court's implicit finding that Mr. Horton was legitimately in control of the vehicle. 
Therefore, assuming this Court accedes to the State's request to reach the standing 
issue,15 it should conclude that Mr. Horton does, in fact, have standing. 
1. Drivers, Leqitimatelv in Control Of The Automobiles Thev Drive, Generally 
Have Reasopgtie Expectations Of Privacy- In Those-Automobiles, So As 
To Confer Upon Those DrivergJhe Standinq-Necessa-ly To Contest Illeqal 
Governmental Searches Of Those Automobiles 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the test for determining whether 
a defendant has the "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends 
... upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128, 143 (1978) (emphasis added). Therefore, the question in this case, as in all Fourth 
l4 The term "standing" is no longer a technically accurate way to describe the relevant 
inquiry in this case as the United States Supreme Court has rejected the concept of 
"standing" insofar as that concept implicates only procedural rules: "[ljn determining 
whether a defendant is able to show the violation of his ... Fourth Amendment rights, 
the 'definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive 
Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing."' Minnesota v. Carfer, 525 U.S. 83, 
88 (1998) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1978)). Nevertheless, since 
the courts continue to use the term "standing" imprecisely, that term is also used 
imprecisely by Mr. Horton to describe the relevant inquiry in this case. 
l5 See Parts I(F), infra (arguing alternatively that the State may not assert the standing 
issue for the first time on appeal and, even if it can, and even if this Court determines 
that Mr. Horton failed to meet his burden of demonstrating standing, it should not affirm 
the district court's order but, instead, remand the case for further fact-finding on the 
standing issue). 
Amendment cases where the defendant's standing is at issue, is whether Mr. Horton 
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle he drove on June 7, 2008. 
While the State concedes that an occupant with either an ownership or a 
possessory right to a vehicle has a legitimate expectation of privacy so as to confer 
standing to challenge an illegal search of that vehicle (Respondent's Brief, p.6 (quoting 
State v. Foldesi, 131 Idaho 778, 780, 963 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Ct. App. 1998))), it then 
turns around and argues a contrary position. The State contends that because 
Mr. Horton did not own the car at issue in this case, he could not have had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in that vehicle and, therefore, did not have standing to contest the 
illegal search of that car. (See generally Respondent's Brief, pp.26-28 (arguing that the 
fact that Mr. Horton lacked a "proprietary interest" in the car undermined his claim of 
standing)). For example, the State argues at one point that "[elven if he had he would 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle that he was supposed to pick up 
from one place and deliver to another." (Respondent's Brief, p.27.) 
The State's argument is flawed as a matter of law. In Rakas, the United States 
Supreme Court made it clear that standing does not turn on ownership. The full quote 
from Rakas is as follows: "[The] capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon 
whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 (emphasis added). 
Indeed, every federal circuit court of appeals to have addressed the issue16 has held 
l6 Although undersigned counsel was unable to locate cases from the Fourth and 
District of Columbia standing for the proposition that an individual legitimately driving a 
vehicle has standing to contest searches of that vehicle, nor has counsel found any 
that non-owners of automobiles, who are legitimately driving those cars, have standing 
to contest governmental searches of those vehicles. See, e.g., United States v. 
Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1401-02 ( I l t h  Cir. 1998) (authorized driver of rental car has 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the car, even after expiration of the rental 
agreement); United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 548 ( I l t h  Cir. 1987) (driver of car 
borrowed from friend has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car); United States 
V. Valdez Hocker, 333 F.3d 1206, 7209-1 1 (10th Cir. 2003) (driver of car borrowed from 
relative of owner believed to have authority to loan car out has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the car); United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 646-47 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(authorized driver of rental car has reasonable expectation of privacy in the car, even 
after expiration of the rental agreement); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.1313, 1316-1 7 
(9th Cir. 1980) (driver of car borrowed from friend has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the car, but passenger does not); United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 1223, 1224, 
1225 (8th Cir. 1998) (driver of rental car borrowed from authorized driver has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the car); United States v. Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 
779 n.1 (8th Cir. 1983) (driver of car borrowed from nephew's roommate, where driver 
has borrowed same car on prior occasions, has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the car); United States v. Walker, 237 F.3d 845, 848-49 (7th Cir. 2001) (authorized 
driver of rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car); United States v. 
Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1417-19 (7th Cir. 1990) (driver of borrowed car has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the car); United States v. Griffin, 729 F.2d 475, 483 
cases from those circuits holding that a legitimate driver does not have any such 
standing. 
n.1 I (7th Cir. 1984) (unlicensed driver, as well as his passenger, of car borrowed from 
a close relative, both have reasonable expectations of privacy in the car); Unifed 
States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2001) (unauthorized driver of rental car has 
reasonable expectation of privacy when unauthorized driver also paid for rental and was 
spouse of sole authorized driver); United States v. Lee, 898 F.2d 1034, 1037-38 
(5th Cir. 1990) (renterlauthorized driver of rental truck, as well as unauthorized driver 
entrusted with truck, have reasonable expectations of privacy in the truck); United 
States v. Baker, 221 F.3d 438, 442-43 (3d Cir. 2000) (driver of car borrowed from friend 
and driven for multiple weeks has reasonable expectation of privacy in car); United 
States v. Ponce, 947 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1991) ("To mount a challenge to a search 
of a vehicle, defendants must show, among other things, a legitimate basis for being in 
it, such as permission from the owner."); United Stafes v. Pena, 961 F.2d 333, 337 
(2d Cir. 1992) ("It is not the law, however, that only the owner of a vehicle may have a 
Fourth Amendment privacy interest therein that is protected against governmental 
invasion. Rather, the borrower of an automobile can possess such an interest."); cf., 
e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 943 F.2d 110, 114 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Had Sanchez 
demonstrated a more intimate relationship with the car's owner or a history of regular 
use of the Camaro-from which a presumption of permission could be drawn-we 
would have been likely to conclude that the totality of the circumstances establ~shed a 
legitimate expectation of privacy.").'7 In contrast, drivers who are not legitimately in 
l7 Granted, various courts have disagreed about which drivers are legitimately in control 
of a vehicle. Compare, e.g., United Sfafes v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 1994) (only 
an individual, authorized by rental car company to drive rental car, has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the rental car), and United Sfates v. Roper, 918 F.2d 885 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (same), and United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346 ( I  l t h  Cir. 1982) 
control of the vehicles they drive do not have standing to contest governmental 
searches of those vehicles. See, e.g., United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 412 
(4th Cir. 1981) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in stolen vehicle) 
The State relies upon State v. Munhall, 118 ldaho 602, 798 P.2d 61 (Ct. App. 
1990), for its argument that only owners of vehicles have standing to contest the 
searches of those vehicles. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.6-8.) However, Munhall 
stands for no such proposition. Rather, in Munhall, the ldaho Court of Appeals held that 
in the relatively narrow situation where a non-owner driver of an automobile has the 
vehicle's owner as his passenger and that owner gives the police officer consent 
to search, the non-owner driver then lacks standing to contest the search. Id. at 605, 
798 P.2d at 64. That holding makes sense, of course, because one would expect that a 
non-owner driver's authority and control over a vehicle, which is at its height when he is 
alone in the car, would be diminished so as to be junior to that of the owner when the 
vehicle's owner is present. Indeed, the fact that the defendant driver's rights over the 
vehicle in Munhall were subservient to those of the owner was made apparent when, 
even though the driver refused to give consent for a police search, he was overruled by 
the car's owner, who did give consent for a search. Id. at 604, 798 P.2d 63. Thus, in 
Idaho, in the narrow situation where the owner is, in fact, present, the driver will not 
(same), with Smith, 263 F.3d at 586 (presuming that an unauthorized driver does not 
have standing, but holding that where the driver had paid for the rental and was married 
to the authorized driver, driver did have standing), and Best, 135 F.3d at 1224, 1225 
(unauthorized driver of rental car has standing if authorized driver gave him permission 
to drive), and Lee, 898 F.2d at 1037-38 (same). As set forth in Part I(H), infra, however, 
the district court implicitly found that Mr. Horton was the legitimate driver of the vehicle 
in this case, and the State has failed to show that that implicit finding is clearly 
erroneous. 
necessarily have an expectation of privacy in the vehicle. See id. at 605, 798 P.2d at 
64. But this does not mean that Idaho does not follow the apparently universal rule that 
the legitimate driver of an automobile generally has an expectation of privacy in that car 
and, therefore, has standing to contest a search of that car. Indeed, at least two federal 
circuit courts of appeals have reconciled the general rule that non-owner drivers in 
legitimate control of a vehicle have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that vehicle, 
with the narrow exception for instances in which the non-owner driver is accompanied 
by the vehicle's owner. In United Stafes v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 965 (1st Cir. 1982), 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the driver's control over the vehicle in 
question was "diluted by the owner's presence," and that he had no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Likewise, in United Stafes v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 
1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 1991), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the fact that 
the owner of the vehicle was present at the time of the traffic stop distinguished that 
case from all those that have held that non-owner drivers of cars entrusted to them by 
another do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those vehicles. However, as 
noted above, both the First and the Tenth Circuits adhere to the general rule that a 
driver, unaccompanied by the car's owner, who is legitimately behind the wheel, does 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. See Valdez Hocker, 333 F.3d 
at 1209-11 (10th Cir.); Sanchez, 943 F.2d at 114 (1st Cir.). 
The State's argument, at its heart, is a request that this Court adopt a new rule, 
unprecedented in its curtailment of Fourth Amendment protections. To do so, however, 
would be to contravene the explicit holding of the United State's Supreme Court's 
Rakas decision, ignore a rule of law adopted by every federal circuit which has had an 
opportunity to address it, and expand the MunhaN exception beyond its original intent. 
Instead of doing that, this Court should hold that a driver, legitimately driving another's 
automobile, generally has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that automobile. 
2. The District Court Implicitly Found That Mr. Horton Was Leqitimately 
Drivinq The Automobile In Question, And The State Has Failed To 
Demonstrate Clear Error In That Implicit Findinq 
The record clearly and unambiguously establishes that Mr. Horton was driving 
the vehicle in question on June 7, 2008. (Tr.Vol.2, p.7, L.24 - p.8, L.4, Tr.Vol.2, p.12, 
Ls.3-8.) Despite the relative meagerness of the record regarding Mr. Horton's 
possessory interest in the vehicle (the sparseness of which is understandable since the 
State never questioned Mr. Horton's standing to challenge the illegal search of the 
vehicle), the district court nevertheless proceeded to address the merits of Mr. Horton's 
suppression motion. (Tr. Vo1.2, p.38, L.21 - p.40, L.17.) By doing so, the district court 
implicitly applied the appropriate legal standard (See Part I(F)(l), supra) and found that 
because Mr. Horton had legitimate authority and control over the vehicle, he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehcile, thereby conferring upon him the 
standing necessary to contest Officer Sunada's search. 
Thus, if the State wishes to challenge Mr. Horton's standing, it must first 
demonstrate that the district court's implicit finding of legitimate authority and control 
over the vehicle was clearly erroneous. However, it simply cannot do so. Given that 
Mr. Horton was the driver of the vehicle and had exercised authority and control over 
that vehicle, it was reasonable for the district court to infer that Mr. Horton's control over 
the vehicle was legitimate. Indeed, in the vast majority of instances where one person 
uses another's vehicle, that use is, in fact, legitimate. People borrow friends' cars; 
people use cars technically "owned" by other family members and do not even think of it 
as "borrowing" since, despite the name(s) on the registration and/or title, the vehicles 
are considered to be family cars; people rent cars while on vacation or when their own 
vehicles are being repaired; people drive their employers' cars for business purposes. 
Indeed, at least one court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, has held that, despite 
the fact that the burden of establishing standing rests with the defendant, once he has 
made a prima facie showing with evidence that he was driving a car which he said had 
been borrowed, "[tlhe burden is on the government to prove by a preponderance that 
property is not being used with the permission of the owner." Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1418. 
Thus, in that case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was not the 
defendant's burden to disprove the State's allegation that he was not in legitimate 
control of the car because it was stolen; it was the State's burden to prove that the car 
had been stolen. Id. 
In the present case, the State has failed to identify a single fact tending to show 
that Mr. Horton's operation and control of the vehicle was illegitimate. (See generally 
Respondent's Brief.) Indeed, no such facts appear anywhere in the record. 
Accordingly, the State has failed to meet its burden of showing that the district court 
clearly erred in implicitly finding that Mr. Horton exercised legitimate authority and 
control over the vehicle so as to give him a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
vehicle, and, therefore, standing to contest the illegal search of that vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Horton respectfully requests that this Court reverse the denial of his motion to 
suppress, vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand the matter for further 
proceedings. 
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